ANTITRUST IN EUROPE: NATIONAL
POLICIES AFTER 1945
HANS B. ThIoRELLI*
This is the second in a series of three lectures entitled "Antitrust in Europe" delivered
at the University of Chicago Law School in the autumn of 1958.1 The first lecture was devoted to the social economic, political,and legal environment in Europe during the period
1915-1945, on the premise that a fairly thorough discussion of that environment was essential to any understanding of public policy toward monopolistic phenomena and practices. That lecture supported the following conclusions: The three decades comprising the
two World Wars may be characterizedas an era of cartelization.This reaction againstthe
ideas of economic liberalism which had originatedin that same part of the world one hundred and fifty years earlierwas motivated by a number of powerfulfactors: the great wars,
the depressions, economic philosophies of the stagnationistvariety, political ideologies of
a totalitarianilk, and a widespreadpessimism resultingfrom the realizationthat whoever
won the first war, Europe as a whole lost. Wartime mobilization efforts fostered a
climate of restrictionand regulationwhich lingered on well into the twenties. That decade,
less than roaringin most nations of Europe, was followed by the Great Depression, which
even in this country temporarily fostered a cartel system, the NRA. Stagnationistsand
pessimists alike preached the merit of holding on to what one already had: any change
was probablyfor the worse. Nazis andfascists sponsored the corporatestate, in which each
sector of the economy was governed by cartels or similargroups. Other nationsfound themselves grasping after public and private regulatory schemes in self-defense against the
economic warfare of totalitarianstates. Cartelizationreached a logical climax in World
War II.
During this era businessmen were prone to talk about the stabilization of markets and
the rationalizationof industries on a collective basis, and about the necessity of avoiding
the wastes of competition. Free enterprise did not signify in Europe a business economy
insideof whichfreedoin prevailed, but stoodfor the desire of business to keep the government
from exercising public control over economic life. Labor in most countries,while blasting
monopolies and cartels as evils of capitalism,welcomed them as ultimately facilitating the
"expropriation of the expropriators." Conservatives and socialistsalike stoodfor regulation
(the quarrel was merely who was to regulate whom), while liberalsin rank and influence
represented a lost generation.
Such a background was not conducive to radical departuresin the field of monopoly
policy. In Britain the common law doctrines againstmonopolization and restraint of trade
had had their teeth pulled before World War I, and in the inter-war period that nation,
as well as those on the continent, abided by the principle of Roman Law emphasizing the
sanctity of any contracts not clearly criminal in nature. Statutes against unfair competition were directed againstsuch practicesas bribery and misleadingadvertising rather than
against monopolistic practices.
In some respects the environment thus depicted has undergone significantchange in the
last ten orfifteen years. Appreciatingthe dangersof generalization,one may stillcharacterize the change as representinga renewal of economic liberalism.
* Research Consultant, Marketing Services Research Service, General Electric Company.
'The first lecture is summarized in the text. The third, on European participation in international efforts to control restrictive business practices, deal primarily with the Coal and
Steel Community and the European Economic Community. The text of the first and third
lectures will appear in 8 U. of Chi. L. S. Rec., No. 2 (1959).
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I.

REVIVAL OF LIBERALISM

unnew brand of economic liberalism first appeared in a very general
reaction against the enforced scarcities and regimentation of the war
years and a concomitant interest in material progress and higher standards of living. The hostility to regimentation gradually matured into a new respect
for private initiative and a recognition that competition need not be wasteful
but, indeed, might be a powerful force working for economic growth and
greater productivity. The liberalism also manifested itself in a new concern
for the greatest possible liberalization of international trade. Indeed, the
predilection for free international trade is a good deal more reliable in some
European countries today than in the United States.
While there may be other underlying causes of the new and somewhat
relativistic liberalism, two potent factors deserve mention: the enormous
needs involved in reconstructing war-ravaged nations, needs which obviously
could not be met by old-style restrictionism, and the education supplied by the
United States under various aspects of the Marshall Plan. Direct pressure was
applied to recipient nations to do away with the cartel mentality as at least
a formal condition of obtaining American aid. In addition, most of the European
productivity teams of business, labor, and government leaders sent to this
country under the Plan were greatly impressed with the achievements of the
American system.
A system of greater economic freedom, supported by governmental measures
where necessary, also began to be advocated in some academic circles, notably
in the Ordo School under the late German economist Walter von Eucken.
Disciples of this school prominent in public life are Ludwig Erhard and the
head of the new Federal Cartel Office of Germany, Dr. Eberhard Gunther.
Although the new liberal ideas have led to a certain renaissance of liberal
political parties, it is even more significant that those ideas have quite noticeably
infiltrated the ideology of both labor and conservative parties, still the most
powerful parties in Europe.
Under the impact of the neo-liberal ideas public policy with regard to
monopoly and restrain of trade has gradually become reoriented. This process
has given no evidence of having reached a termination yet and has yielded
a number of specific results in the past twelve years. Of this span the first
half may be viewed as the period of tentative reconsideration. During that
period the world witnessed the breaking up of some of the major German
combines by the Military Government, the somewhat grudging acceptance
of the anti-cartel provisions of the Occupation Statutes of Germany, the
passage of a cartel registration law in Sweden in 1946, and the enactment
of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act in
the United Kingdom in 1948.
But the main wave of legislation, not only in the countries just referred to but
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also in most other western European nations, has surged forth since 1952.
In some instances the results have been remolded versions of prewar legislation,
but it must be emphasized that-as far as this century is concerned-a public
policy encouraging competition rather than restraint thereof is of very recent
origin in Europe. This, among other things, makes it hazardous to venture
a reasoned judgment as to the effectiveness of national policies.
II. ComPArATmvx ANALYSIS

Before proceeding to an analysis of current West European approaches in the
field of antitrust, two observations concerning the methods of comparative
law should be made. The most popular method by far in the field of comparative
law is first to examine the legislation of country A, thereafter the legislation
of country B, then country C, and so on-in other words to make a series of
separate case studies of national legislation. Apart from the obvious fact
that this method tends to be less of a strain than other methods on the researcher, its principal strength is that it views each national piece of legislation
as an integrated system. It is especially tempting to take this country-bycountry approach in studying restrictive business practices legislation in view
of the amazing diversity of public policy in the area. However, this method
has the weakness that it really does not involve any comparison at all. It
only provides the basic materials for a comparison, but leaves the most difficult
task, that of systematic comparison, to the reader.
The main alternative procedure, of course, demands a scheme of classification,
a taxonomy on the basis of which meaningful direct comparisons may be made.
Some efforts have been made in this direction in the comparative study of
antitrust legislation. One approach has been to divide national legislative systems into those based on the notion of prohibiting restrictive business practices
on the one hand, and those regulating or eliminating specific abuses of such practices on the other hand. A similar way of slicing the cake has been to examine
public policy from the viewpoint of whether it is primarily preventive or primarily corrective in character. For example, the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices made a comparative survey of legislation in which the following classification was used: (1) legislation providing
for surveillance of restrictive business practices; (2) legislation requiring the
adoption of such practices; (3) legislation providing for prevention and control
of such practices; and (4) emergency legislation. It is admitted that none of
these systems of classification is very good. To detail the objections would
go too far afield, but it may be said generally that the categories used are so
broad and overlap so much that they are of rather little value.
How, then, shall the methodological issue be tackled? Realizing that perfection is unattainable, one might prefer to make use of both major alternatives
discussed above. However, space does not permit a survey of antitrust legislation nation by nation. Instead, attention will be focussed on a direct corn-
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parative analysis using a taxonomy which, to a degree, is both novel and more
satisfactory than its predecessors in this particular field of study. The taxonomy
involves five categories: stated objectives, aims regarding the interaction of
firms, approaches, scope, and enforcement.
A. Stated policy objectives.-The comparative analysis of West European
laws will begin with an examination of the official aims of these laws as stated
in their titles, preambles, or introductory sections. (Of course, reference
could also be made to the legislative history of these statutes, but this has been
deemed inadvisable, as the relative significance of such history as an indicator
of legislative or governmental intent varies considerably from country to country.) The following are some of the passages in the laws seemingly intended to
indicate the direction of public policy:
UNIED KiNGDox: "the registration and judicial investigation of certain restrictive
trading agreements"; "prohibition of such agreements when found contrary to
the public interest"; "prohibit the collective enforcement of conditions regulating
the resale price of goods." [Preamble of 1956 legislation.]
GERMaANY: "Law against Restraint of Competition." [Title.]
FRANcE: "to put an end to practices which by restricting fair competition in business,
prevent any fall in prices." [Preamble.]
BELGIUM: "protection against abuse of economic power." [Title.]
DEwNXA: "prevent unreasonable prices and conditions of trade and to safeguard
the best conditions possible for the free exercise of trade." [Text.]
NOnwAY: The Norwegian law has an entire sm6rg.sbord of aims. The policy is to
"promote full employment, efficient utilization of means of production, counteract
crises in trade and promote a reasonable distribution of national income by (a) ...
counteracting prices, profits and terms of trade which have an unreasonable effect,
(b) preventing higher dividends than are defensible, (c) safeguarding against undesirable conditions of trade or competition, and against restrictions on competition
which are unreasonable or damaging to public interests." [Text.]
SWEDEN: "promoting competition in business such as is desirable from a public
point of view." [Text.]
FINL.N: "prevention of damaging effects of restrictions of competition in business."
[Text.]
It is readily apparent that the aims of these statutes have not been stated
in terms making the legislation easy to compare. Some nations, by legislative
habit, do not specify the general objective or underlying philosophy of their
laws. Others prefer to state them in broad and vague terms: still others go into
considerable detail. In some instances there is also an unmistakable tendency
to think in rather grandiloquent terms in stating the objectives of policy.
It is somewhat like declarations in favor of "sugar and spice and everything
nice" or "wine, women, and song." With a sigh of cosmopolitan resignation,
one finds it necessary to turn from the stated to the real objectives of the
laws, knowing full well of the dangers of misinterpretation.
B. Aims regarding the interaction of firms.-The discussion will proceed
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by classifying the intended or incidental effects which the antitrust laws
have on the organization of economic life; that is, the aims or effects of those
laws will be considered in terms of the relationship and interaction between
firms. While this may not be the only yardstick against which objectives can
be measured comparatively, it is certainly an important one. The antitrust policies can be divided into four groups, depending upon the degree to which they
affect competitive interaction: pro-competitive policies, policies with an ambivalent effect on competition, anti-competitve policies, and, finally, a-competitive policies-policies of indifference from the viewpoint of their intended
effect on competition. The meaning of these terms may perhaps best be clarified
by illustrating what kinds of approaches are used in various statutes for implementing the different policies. A pro-competitive policy may be implemented
by such means as publicity, prohibition, dissolution, and invalidation of
restrictive business practices. Policies with ambivalent effects on competition
are manifested in laws based on the notion of fostering countervailing powers
in the economy, or laws undertaking only ad hoc regulation of restrictions
on trade, or laws which only aim at the regulation of specific types of such
practices. An anti-competitive policy is exemplified by a compulsory cartelization law.
In the case of an a-competitive policy, the possible impact on competition
is decidedly of secondary interest to the legislator. A law resulting from an acompetitive policy may include provisions for the certification or sanctioning
of restrictive agreements under certain conditions, or for the continuous regulation of prices or of entire branches of industry or trade. While the preservation
of competition as such is not recognized as a positive value in such cases,
the legislator is usually conscious of the fact that he is intervening in the affairs
of business by restructuring the ways in which competitors interact with each
other.
While theoretically distinct, the criteria for classifying policies tend to
overlap when applied against the background of real life. It must also be emphasized that to date this yardstick is of rather speculative value because of
the limited experience under most European laws. Furthermore, a critic cannot
fail to point out that logically there should be a supplementary scale dealing
with aims regarding the interaction of firms not engaged in competition and,
quite particularly, the relationship between producer and distributor. Nevertheless, it is felt that the scale even in its present form is reasonably inclusive
and reasonably intelligible. Moreover, it has the advantage of improving
understanding of the effects of the various instruments or approaches used
to implement West European antitrust laws. It is readily admitted, however,
that no nation clearly falls into any one of the categories mentioned. (Indeed,
if one disregards the Sherman Act, the most clear-cut example of a pro-competitive statute in the world, it is submitted that not even American antitrust
legislation is clearly classifiable in terms of its aims, and much less so in terms
of its effect on competition.)
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When more is learned about the long-term effects, as contrasted with the
legal verbalizations of European policies, one might well try to fit them into
the suggested or some similar mold, classifying them according to the main
emphasis of the law. However, for the time being most of the laws are too
recent to permit this to be done meaningfully. Instead, a much more arbitrary
ranking will be made along what may be called a sliding scale of friendliness
towards competition. It must be kept in mind that this ranking considers
only the formal legislative provisions of the various nations, and not the
degree to which these provisions are enforced, nor the possibility that certain
areas of the respective economies, such as socialized industries or public
utilities, may be entirely withdrawn from antitrust legislation. Going from
the "highest" to the "lowest" degree of friendliness to competition the nations
of western Europe might rank as follows: Germany, Sweden, Britain, Denmark,
Finland, France, Belgium, Ireland, Norway, Netherlands, and Austria. It
must be emphasized that no exactness is claimed for this scale; while it is
probably valid in indicating the part of the entire spectrum in which each
national policy would fall, the specific ranking of one nation in relation to
its immediate neighbor on this scale is necessarily quite arbitrary.
C. Approaches.-The third category in the suggested taxonomy is that of
the main approaches or strategies which are being used to implement the
objectives of national legislation. An attempt to indicate these approaches
is presented in Table 1. In this table P stands for approaches given primary
emphasis and S for those given secondary importance. Before an analysis is
made of Table 1 and the following tables, a number of reservations should
be made. The borderlines between approaches of primary and secondary significance, for one thing, are rather vague. In several instances it seemed that
more than one approach used in a given nation, for example, the United
Kingdom, had to be labeled as primary. Furthermore none of the tables purport
to be exhaustive. They are intended only to represent the cardinal features
of national systems. Due to the many complexities involved in international
comparison, it is not possible to vouch for all details. And, indeed, the list
of variables in all the tables is strictly tentative. Without further research one
cannot be certain of having settled upon the most relevant categories or the
most clear-cut or instructive ones. It does seem that the analysis has been
taken one step beyond that of the previous writers on comparative antitrust
law, but perhaps it is a step onto thin ice.
In Table 1, the great variety of approaches used by West European countries
has been divided into four major categories: publicity, prohibition, invalidation,
and regulation. Readily apparent is a major cluster of primary interest in
publicity. There is a considerable grouping of secondary interest in prohibition,
with which has been lumped dissolution, and another cluster in different
varieties of regulation, especially of the ad hoc type, by which is meant regulation
dovetailed to what the enforcement authorities consider the special needs
of each individual industry whose practices come under review. Invalidation,
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the favorite strategy of the old common law, draws only scattered support
in contemporary European legislation.
It should be added that a special difficulty in making a classification at a
time when national policies are only a few years old in most instances is that
one really does not know yet whether an approach that on paper seems to be
highly important will prove to be as significant in practice. For instance, no
one yet knows with what intensity the United Kingdom will apply the alternative sanctions of invalidation and prohibition. Similarly, it is impossible to
say at this time what the balance will be between the sweeping, ShermanTABLE 1
APPROACHES*
NATIONS
AP5ROcHESNethGerUK

France.

many

Publicity:
By registration .....
By special investigations ............
Prohibition:
Broad or narrow...
Dissolution ........
Invalidation .........
Regulation:
Compulsory cartels..
Countervailance ....
Ad hoc .............
Re specific practices
Certification .......
Continuous ........

P

S

P
S
S

Belgium

Den-

erland-

mark

Norway

Sweden

Finland

Austria

P

P

P

P

P

P

S

P

e-

S
S
P

P

S

S

S

Ireland

S

S
S

S

S
S

P
S
P

S

S

S

S

P

S
P

P

* P stands for what tentatively seems to be a primary approach, S for what seems to be a secondary approach.

Act-inspired language with which cartel arrangements are made subject to
invalidation by German law and the legion of exemptions by which such
arrangements may in fact be authorized and surrounded with an aura of
official approval.
D. Scope.-Table 2, which relates to the scope of legislation, is divided
into two parts. The first deals with areas specifically within the purview of
legislation; the second deals with matters explicitly or implicitly exempt
from the operation of national antitrust laws. It is striking that all of the
laws included are written to embrace cartel agreements. This, indeed, is the
most important feature which European systems have in common. The table
also lists approximately one-half of the nations as including single-firm monopolies or corporate combinations within the reach of their laws. It must be
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remembered, however, that the provisions aimed at single-firm combinations
have less teeth in them, as a rule, than those designed to attack cartel problems.
The reader may wonder why separate mention has been made of business
practices, as such operations will necessarily be the subject of deliberation
in any consideration of cartel cases. Their inclusion as a separate heading in the
table is warranted by the fact that some nations have special regulation of
specific practices or of competitive practices in general, whether engaged in
by a small enterprise, a single-firm monopoly or a cartel. There is considerable
diversity in the approach taken by various nations to the regulation of business
practices. Most nations dealing with specific practices have regulations concerning resale price maintenance. Some of these also regulate joint bidding arrangements or refusals to sell. France prohibits discriminatory price increase-prices
apparently move only one way in that country. There is rarely a blanket
prohibition of any of these practices; that is, if there is a general proscription
of a practice the law usually provides for exemptions under limited circumstances.
With respect to exemptions, it should be noted that labor union activities
are universally excluded from the operation of European antitrust laws. This
is due in part to the European impression that the application of American
antitrust law to labor activities produced undesirable results, and in part to
the fact that Socialist or Social Democratic parties have had a heavy hand in
framing or supporting the European laws. In contast, cooperatives generally
are not exempt from cartel legislation, despite their very strong position both
as businesses and as pressure groups in such countries as the United Kingdom
and Scandinavia. European laws tend to duck the issue between patent and
antitrust legislation, in spite of the rich American experience on this point.
The implications of the rather general exemption of restrictive business practices
in export trade from the operation of national laws to the antitrust provisions
of the European Economic Community and other past or potential international
efforts to control restrictive business practices in trade between nations are
2
discussed in another publication.
The question marks in the exemption portion of the table represent in part
at least a failure or an unwillingness of legislators to face up to the borderline
issues. The vagueness about the critical fringe issues may be seen in its proper
perspective when it is remembered that it took a long time to settle several
of these issues in the United States. But it must also be admitted that some of
the question marks indicate that not enough is known of the general background
of the legislative systems of the nations involved to perceive how enforcement
authorities will handle borderline problems. In some cases too, these problems
may be regulated by other laws such as agricultural adjustment acts or laws
governing specific public enterprises.
E. E.nforcernent.-The third table deals with enforcement. It is primarily
2 See note I supra.
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concerned with the number and types of agencies involved in the enforcement
effort, only secondarily with procedure, and not at all with sanctions. Although
this considerably restricts the limits of analysis, it was found that there was
too much variation between nations and, indeed, too many variations within
nations regarding different types of action to make meaningful and practical
a more detailed comparison of points of procedure. With respect to sanctions,
it may be added that they coincide in large part with what was termed "approaches" in Table 1. The information on the private actions refers to the
possibility of damage suits between private parties in the regular court system
or to the existence of a statutory guarantee whereby any member of a cartel
may withdraw at any time or at specified intervals without incurring any liability for damages or any other legal sanction.
Table 3 refers only to the mainstream of enforcement. A variety of procedures
TABLE 3
ENFORCEMENT
NAIONS

Neth-

UK

Private action (availano
bility) .............
Agencies of original jurisdiction (number
of different types
performing particular functions):
Fact-finding:
Registration ......
1
Special investiga2
tion ...........
Background for
1
prosecution....
Prosecution .........
1
Adjudication:
Independent tribu0
nal ............
Ministerial agency
0
Regular court, pri0
vate suit .......

Regular court, public suit .........
Special court ....
Appdlate procedure
(availability):
Forum:
Judicial ..........

Executive ........
Questions:
Fact .............
Law .............
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many
glum lands
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Finland
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Ireland
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no
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no

no

yes

no

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

1
1

1
2

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

2
2

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
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0
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3

2
0

3
0

3
0

1
0

?
0

0
2

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
1

0
0

1
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
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0
0
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yes
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and devices are used in exceptional cases, and in some countries (Germany,
for example) the number of cases handled by the exceptional procedures may
well be greater than the number of cases handled by the procedure designated
in the table. In gathering information concerning agencies of original jurisdiction, the author noted frequent overlap in particular agencies between the
fact-finding and action stages. Adjudication, however, tends to be placed in
the hands of agencies not concerned with the first two stages. The variety of
tribunals used for adjudication is striking, although independent administrative
bodies tend to be the most frequently designated type of agency.
It should be remarked that registration has a significance which greatly
varies in different countries. In some nations all agreements must be registered,
in others agreements need be registered only if the registration agency so
requests. In the United Kingdom the register has the two-fold function of making agreements a matter of public record and supplying the basis for enforcement
action. In that country all registered agreements must be considered by the
Restrictive Practices Court. In Sweden, registration of itself means no more
than that an agreement becomes a matter of public knowledge. There is
no implication of any sanction; nor is it necessary that the registered contract
be explicitly considered by enforcement authorities. In Austria, registration
is virtually a certification of government approval of the restrictive agreements
registered.
In the table, the term "special investigations" refers either to comprehensive
studies of an entire industry or trade or to investigations into the existence
and effects of particular restrictive trade practices. Analogues in the United
States may be found in the many reports of the Federal Trade Commission
on concentration in various industries, the prevalence of interlocking directorates, and similar subjects.
With regard to appellate procedure, it has been found that there is never
a clear-cut right of appeal to ministers or cabinets by affected private parties,
despite the fact that in some countries those executives have the power to
overrule the decisions of lower tribunals in cartel cases. Only in the United
Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, Finland, and Austria, moreover, is there any
clear-cut right to appeal even in the regular judicial system. The rather limited
right of appeal found in some countries, for example Sweden, must be considered
in the light of the rigorous criteria specified for actions as well as decisions
by the enforcement agency, the broad publicity surrounding the procedure,
and the well-defined and quite limited powers of the enforcement agency.
In such cases concern for the rights of citizens may not strongly demand
the right of appeal, although this writer has advocated the inclusion in Swedish
antitrust legislation of the right of appeal to the regular court system.
III. SU MARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Legislation. Some general observations can now be distilled from the
details of the five classification schemes analyzed above. Before considering
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this summary, the reader should remember that the work accomplished to
date has been only preliminary in nature. Thus, some of the observations
made below may eventually prove to be overgeneralizations.
1. A striking common feature of Western European antitrust legislation
is its emphasis on publicity. This feature is especially noteworthy because publicity about business relations is a great novelty in many of the nations in
which business traditionally has been carried on behind a veil of secrecy.
As discussed above, the most popular means of insuring publicity is the requirement that restrictive agreements be registered.
2. Though all legislation concerning restrictive business practices has its
origin in the belief that at least some such practices are undesirable (and
at least to that extent the legislation supports competitive forces in the economy),
the degree of friendliness to competition varies markedly between different
European nations. Nevertheless, there has been a remarkable breakthrough
from the prewar notion prevalent in many of those nations that competition
is basically an anti-social, disloyal, and generally destructive way of economic
life.
3. There is nowhere to be found in West European antitrust legislation a
general prohibition of all restrictive practices such as is contained in the
Sherman Act.
4. All the antitrust laws concentrate on cartel arrangements.
5. European laws are not, as a rule, much concerned with single-firm
monopolies or corporate combinations as such. The reluctance to attack such
tight combinations probably stems from a rather widespread belief that there
is a positive correlation between size and efficiency, a feeling that cartels
constitute more of a barrier to progress than do individual combines, and a
notion that most national markets in Europe are too small to allow optimum
operation of even single firms in many branches of industry.
6. There is a fairly widespread interest in the regulation of specific restrictive
practices, whether engaged in by cartels or by single firms. Particularly noteworthy is the European interest in resale price maintenance. While a few
of the nations which have special fair-trade regulations go no further than
requiring such agreements to be registered, the more usual practice is to
prohibit fair-trading altogether, albeit with express exceptions for certain trades
like book publishing. In some cases authority is vested in a public body to grant
ad hoc exemptions. Regulation of resale price maintenance, incidentally,
is a marvelous example of how crucial it is to view the law in relation to its
particular task environment instead of making the rather sterile formal
comparisons which are all too usual in this field. For instance, the Danish
prohibition of resale price maintenance is likely to have a much greater effect
on the entire Danish marketing system than a similar prohibition would have
in the United States. In the latter country there is, comparatively speaking,
such hectic competition between various forms of distribution that, even where
resale price maintenance is permitted, rationalization of the distributive appara-
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tus is not stifled. In tight-knit little Denmark, on the other hand, resale price
maintenance agreements traditionally were one of the most effective vehicles
for the complete elimination of all competition in the field of distribution.
Already the rather recent prohibiti(u of this practice in Denmark has had a
quite noticeable effect in promoting the growth of new forms of distribution,
such as discount houses and supermarkets.
7. It is characteristic of European laws that they look to the effect rather
than the intent of restrictive business practices in delineating the grounds
for public action. Contrary to what might be expected, however, this emphasis
on result rather than intent does not seem to make any easier the task of
the enforcement and adjudication agencies. Frequently it is difficult to establish
not only what the effects of a particular agreement are in the short and long
runs but also whether such effects are compatible with the public interest,
a very involved factor.
8. Activities of organized labor are exempt in all West European antitrust
laws. Arrangements exclusively or primarily aimed at operations in export
markets are, as a rule, also beyond the purview of national legislation. In
the few instances where export arrangements are reached by the law, information about them is usually kept in secret files.
9. West European laws tend to leave only vaguely defined the relationships
between antitrust policy on the one hand, and laws governing public enterprises, public utilities, and patents, on the other hand.
10. In all the West European nations special agencies, whether judicial
or administrative tribunals, have been established to handle the enforcement
of antitrust laws. The character and independence of these agencies vis-a-vis
other governmental organs, however, vary greatly from country to country.
11. Action under national antitrust laws usually must be taken on the
formal initiative of public officials, even if the action has been inspired by the
complaints of private citizens. In only a few instances can private parties bring
action before enforcement authorities unless the suit is to obtain approval of
restrictive arrangements, which is part of the procedure in some countries.
12. Similarly, members of cartel agreements typically have no more right
to withdraw from such agreements than they have to break any other agreement
covered by the law of contracts. A few countries have, however, introduced
special laws to facilitate the withdrawal by dissatisfied parties either unconditionally or at certain periodic intervals.
13. All West European enforcement agencies have broad investigatory
powers including, usually, the right to subpoena documents, to hear witnesses,
and to visit the premises of enterprises whose activities are under investigation.
The issuance of a court order may be a necessary preliminary step to the
exercise of some of these investigatory powers.
14. The rights of appeal under West European antitrust laws are generally
quite limited. Where permitted, appeal almost always lies to regular or special
courts rather than to the cabinet or an individual minister.
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B. Enforcernen.-As every serious student knows, the enforcement of any
piece of legislation is always a matter of degree. The question of the intensity
and the effects of enforcement efforts in .'various European jurisdictions is,
therefore, a legitimate one. However, it ii very difficult to give a generalized
answer to this question beyond the statement that in a majority of countries
the legislation is too new to enable one to draw very meaningful conclusions.
It is possible to be fairly specific about the number of registrations in those
countries which have practiced this procedure for some length of time. Thus,
by February 1, 1958, the United Kingdom had collected some 1,850 agreements.
In the Netherlands some 850 national agreements were registered by the end
of 1956; 500 of the 850 were straight price cartels. In addition, the Dutch
had registered some 1,000 regional or local agreements. Denmark and Norway
each had several hundred agreements and a few score dominant concerns
on register. Sweden had 1,727 agreements on file as of May 1, 1958. Of this
total, however, 842 had ceased to be operative after registration. This proportion
of voluntary dissolutions is far higher than that found in any other country.
Similarly, it is not too difficult to obtain information about the special
investigations undertaken in those countries which rely on this procedure. A
considerable number of such investigations have been undertaken in the
United Kingdom since 1948 (when the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices
Commission was established) and in Norway since the early 1920's when the
registration procedure was established in that country. Sweden has had a score
of studies of the competitive conditions in various industries since 1946.
It is much more difficult to be specific when it comes to a quantitative
evaluation of the specific cases which have been the subject of adjudication.
Indeed, there seems to be little sense in attempting to go into detail on this
point in a comparative survey since so many of the laws are but a few years old.
However, the general observation may be made that the number of cases in
most countries is certainly not smaller than the number of actions brought
under the Sherman Act during its first years of operation.
It is also difficult to determine the general effect of enforcement, let alone
the effectiveness of the enforcement efforts in terms of the stated aims of
national legislation, unless a very detailed study were made of each country's
experience. Such an investigation would have to take into account not only
what has been done under the antitrust laws but also the substantial variations
in the size of the specifically regulated sectors of the particular national economies. The publicly owned or directly regulated sector is, for instance, extremely
large in France and, in spite of American impressions to the contrary, surprisingly small in a country like Sweden. It would of course be necessary also
in such an investigation to know what the nature and extent of restrictive business practices were before the introduction of legislation as compared with
conditions subsequent to passage of the legislation.
It can at least be noted, however, that in many European countries enforcement agencies have been greatly preoccupied with the three related types
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of restrictive practices which may be labeled refusal to sell, boycotts, and
exclusive dealing arrangements. On the other hand, price cartels, illegal per
se in the lJnited States, have often been disregarded by legislators and enforcements agencies in Europe, despite-or perhaps because of-their being
quite common in that part of the world.
In conclusion, it may be said that it is probably the indirect effect of the
mere existence of laws controlling restrictive business practices that is important. The great interest in these matters aroused by all the new publicity
and the fact that legislators have expressed either a modicum of positive faith
in competition or at the very least their concern over some of the more farreaching restrictions thereof are some of the main grounds on which can be
based a prediction that West European economies will continue to grow more
flexible, more competitive.'
3
The chief basis for this prediction, other than the reasons advanced in the text, is the
emergence of the European Economic Community and other plans aimed at the establishment
of a common market in Europe of a size comparable to that presented by the American
economy. See note 1 supra.

